Safety report sheds light on UA shooting

The UA recently published a safety report regarding the events before, during and after last year’s fatal shooting of Dr. Thomas Meixner, head of the department of hydrology and atmospheric science (HAS).

The university commissioned the PAX Group LLC to write the safety report, analyzing what happened and how incidents like these can be averted.

“PAX’s findings … are intended to support the recovery from the traumatic impact of this devastating act of violence,” the report stated, “by properly memorializing the loss with clear guidance for achieving impactful action for all University of Arizona campuses.”

The report indicates a failure to assess nearly a year’s worth of threats from the suspect and to communicate among leadership groups to address them. PAX’s recommendations moving forward include vital updates in three recurring themes: threat management; leadership; and concise, transparent communication.

While 20 pages include their own analysis of what happened, the last 80 or so pages document most interactions regarding the safety breach since Dec. 1, 2017. The event log starts here to note key developments with the university’s Threat Assessment Management Team (TAMT), which led to the events before the shooting.

“The information presented within this timeline may not identify every instance of an event or communication related to the Incident,” PAX reported. “However, it does support PAX’s recommendations, and is based upon the information that we have been able to scrutinize in our review to determine the best practices for threat assessment and management in the future.”

On Oct. 5, 2022, Meixner was shot in his office by suspect Murad Dervish, an expelled graduate student who had a previous incident with him almost a year prior. What started as an argument over a test in November 2021 with a separate professor led to escalating threats toward HAS faculty, students and university staff.

Dervish was suspended, released from his teaching assistant contract with the university, and banned from campus. After an appeal with the university hearing board and continuing threats, the suspect was expelled in June 2022. Dervish then trespassed on school grounds and encountered faculty, including Meixner, multiple times before the shooting in October.

According to the document, almost every incident or threat from Dervish was reported. Multiple university groups, including the dean of students office, UAPD and the threat assessment management team, were involved in this situation. UAPD filed two charges against Dervish and attempted an arrest in April 2022. The groups were operating during the situation, but not as efficiently as they should have been, the report stated.

“Overall, the university’s culture of moving from incident to incident, without improving the process to create a clear threat management and investigative strategy, led to missed opportunities for mitigation and intervention,” the PAX Group stated.

After reviewing 79 interviews and thousands of related documents, PAX identified the three major themes throughout four key groups: TAMT, University Crisis Response, the Communications Department and UAPD.

TAMT was not effective for the scope and size of the university. The team was comprised of expert members, but lacked direct leadership and the process to engage and take action. Along with the other groups, TAMT was up to date on past report guidelines, but the decentralized nature of the team, and all associated groups, led to ineffective communication.

“An ineffective TAMT process led to a series of decisions and actions that presented multiple opportunities for the subject to continue to harass and threaten University of Arizona community members,” PAX stated. “The decentralization of nearly all major processes across campus prevents these individuals from effecting necessary changes to plans and programs.”

The University Crisis Response included a campus emergency response plan, but it lacked the mechanisms to train all key personnel in an emergency. According to the report, many people interviewed could not recall the last campuswide drill (for example, a fire drill), but there are also few reports of community members actively seeking drills until an incident occurs.

However, because the university is spread across multiple buildings, emergency drills are complicated and underappreciated. This also includes an appropriate alerting system.

“Inadequate security systems and procedures throughout the university and its buildings made the campus vulnerable to internal and external threats,” PAX stated.

The communications department has a UAlert system available for students, but before the incident, the service was not mandatory. Coupled with service glitches and unspecific messaging, students and faculty were confused about proper safety procedures.

After the shooting, the groups also failed to provide support and clear contact with the community. The Crisis Incident Response Team (CIRT) provides resources during and after traumatic events, but the team was not called to inform the university of further action post-shooting.

The report stated university leadership believed resources needed to respond were released and sufficient, but CIRT can be critical for post-incident resources. Overall, much of the aftermath response was disorganized and fractured.

“Further, no pre-rehearsed, coordinated crisis communications plan existed among the communications teams at the University,” PAX reported. “A lack of coordinated response between University Communications and UAPD resulted in incomplete communications that made the university community feel unheard and unsafe.”

Moreover, UAPD was actively involved in Dervish’s case but failed to pursue the suspect in key moments or establish clear contact with Tucson Police Department or the Pima County attorney’s office. After Dervish’s expulsion, his continued threats led UAPD to seek out the PCAO. The office declined its charge request, due to a lack of “specificity, immediacy and a manner in which to carry out the threat.”

PAX revealed key information from the case that could’ve been used to get the approval, but there was no person, database or other entity where all of it was stored. After each analysis, PAX offered recommendations including this and others like new leadership positions, improved methods of communication, and revised safety strategies.

“Today’s world requires universities to create a centrally led, well-coordinated threat assessment process,” PAX stated. “Combined with a holistic mental health and community intervention response as a way to effectively assess, manage and mitigate threats.”

The safety report also includes university initiatives since the incident, including revisions and proposals to their threat management systems. Much of their work has focused on improving their crisis communication plan and training key staff members in safety during emergencies.

The university commissioned the report to assess its failures on Oct. 5, 2022, and long before the incident. According to the report, many HAS faculty were left to secure their safety even after contacting university leadership, including Meixner. This report is one of the first steps in fixing the system that failed students, faculty and staff.

The PAX Group mentions the impact of the tragedy throughout the report and extends condolences to all parties involved. Hopefully, this incident will create a more robust system to keep the university community safe.

“PAX especially recognizes the traumatic experiences of the Meixner family and the HAS Department survivors,” PAX stated. “Everyone we have encountered in this review has been deeply affected by the events of Oct. 5, 2022, and hopes that the outcome of this review will produce meaningful impact and change to create a safer community.”

This article appears in Apr 13-19, 2023.